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At the inaugural UN session in 1946, an India-sponsored resolution was passed 
with a 2/3rd majority against South Africa’s racist treatment of Indians. India 
continued its activism over racism and apartheid throughout the 1950s though 
the issue was increasingly seen as a painful yearly ritual. Still, Indian diplomats 
persisted in raising the issue every year, despite diminishing results. The British 
settler-colonies were particularly offended by India’s campaign, as it 
challenged the discursive justification for their existence. They rejected what 
they saw as India’s emotional, hypocritical, even imperialist, campaign against 
racism. By tracing the construction and rejection of anti-racist politics, we 
examine the dismissal of racism as a ‘legitimate’ international issue. 
 
Introduction: Anti-racism and its opponents 
Even before its independence, India made racism a matter of international diplomacy. 
This began in 1917, and carried on up until India’s independence, primarily through imperial 
platforms (Thakur, 2017). Just before its independence, however, India took its anti-racist 
project beyond imperial structures to a global platform. Just two days after he was sworn in as 
Vice-President of the interim Indian cabinet, Jawaharlal Nehru (1946, p. 437) wrote to a South 
African Indian leader, Ismail Cahalia: 
 
The struggle in South Africa is… not merely an Indian issue. It concerns all 
Asians whose honour and rights are threatened, and all the people in Asia 
should, therefore, support it. It concerns ultimately the Africans who have 
suffered so much by racial discrimination and suppression. It is a struggle for 
equality of opportunity for all races and against the Nazi doctrine of racialism. 
… Our cause thus becomes a world cause in which all people who believe in 
freedom are interested. 
 
On 7 September 1946, in a radio address to the nation three days after this letter, Nehru 
enshrined anti-racism as a core principle of India’s future foreign policy. Later that year, an 
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Indian delegation led by Vijayalakshmi Pandit achieved a remarkable diplomatic victory over 
Jan Smuts-led South Africa. Not-yet-Independent India had attracted the world’s attention to 
the racial discrimination in South Africa (Lloyd, 1990). 
 
Throughout the late-1940s and 1950s, India’s pursued annual UN resolutions on the 
racial treatment of Indians in South Africa and (from 1952 onwards) apartheid, consistently 
seeking to make racism an international issue. In these debates, India repeatedly challenged 
South Africa’s insistence that race was a ‘domestic’ matter.  
 
In the academic companion to world politics, International Relations (IR), Nicolas 
Guilhot (2014) has noted that the issue of race was struck off the disciplinary agenda in this 
same period. Just as India (and the decolonising world more broadly) sought to ensure race was 
part of world affairs so as to animate anti-racist politics, IR worked to excise its footprints from 
disciplinary theorising. Unfortunate as this was, the discipline has remained trapped within its 
1950s paradigms, only recently seeking to break free of them. The contrived and forced absence 
of race and with it, racism, from IR has only served to further entrench racial hierarchies in 
world politics. Consequently, while much of the burden of critical thinking on race in IR in 
recent years has fallen on uncovering the racial origins of the discipline itself (Vitalis, 2000; 
2005; 2015; Guilhot, 2008; 2014; Long and Schmidt, 2005; Thakur, Davis and Vale, 2017), 
postcolonial scholars have also engaged with race and racism as social constructs which operate 
discursively by shaping perception and identity (Vucetic, 2011; 2014; Davis, 2015). As a result 
of recent interventions (for example, Anievas, Manchanda and Shilliam, 2014), only now have 
the various manifestations of racism and colonial power have become important areas of study 
in IR. 
 
Our intervention into the debate on race and how it is understood in IR is to frame race 
in a new manner. We seek to understand the discourse on race through responses to India’s anti-
racism. The racism/anti-racism binary in world politics was, in many ways, mediated through 
tropes of rationality and security. For white-settler states at the receiving end, if India’s critique 
on racism was acknowledged, it would mean implicitly accepting the argument that racism was 
a global issue. A more useful response was to delegitimise India’s utterances by signposting 
them as ‘irrational’, ‘emotional’ or even ‘imperialist’.  
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Although many scholars have highlighted India’s anti-colonialism as an element of its 
foreign policy (for example: Chacko, 2012; Davis, 2015; Biswas, 2001), its specifically anti-
racist nature has not come in for specific attention. There are, of course, deep connections 
between anti-racism and anti-colonialism. India’s anti-racism was just one part of its broader 
anti-imperial project. Looking through anti-racist, rather than the broader anti-colonial, lenses 
allows for a more specific and more nuanced understanding of the transnational politics of race 
at the ends of empire.  
 
In the following discussion, we begin by examining India’s construction and in 
particular its public performance of anti-racism in the 1950s. Thereafter, we analyse the 
discourses employed by the settler-colonial powers to reject India’s efforts. Australia, Canada 
and South Africa are particularly crucial case studies, as they were intimately connected to India 
by their colonial experiences and the justification for their very existence relied upon the 
racialized discourses which India was rejecting.1 We find that these states drew from the same 
set of narratives in resisting India’s anti-racist politics, albeit with varying degrees of severity, 
demonstrating the transnational nature of the racial discourses. We argue that there were two 
strong strands of discourse in the 1950s that were used to dismiss India’s anti-racism. The first 
is the assertion that India’s anti-racism was ‘irrational’, ‘hypocritical’ and based on 
‘emotionalism’. The second was more extreme. It is the assertion that India’s anti-colonialism 
was itself imperialist, and that India was seeking an empire of its own under the guise of 
opposing racism. As New Zealand did not open its high commission in India until December 
1958, it far had less intimate contact with India, we have excluded it from the study.2  
 
As we are concerned with the intimacy of the responses, we emphasize the private 
responses of diplomats to India’s anti-racist foreign policy, primarily either stationed in India 
or within the UN. The Commonwealth Conferences may seem like an obvious platform for 
such discussions but racial issues were deliberately kept out of the purview of these Conferences 
on the pretext of racial discrimination being a bilateral issue. In fact, a general reference to 
racial discrimination was first mentioned in a Commonwealth communique in 1960 only after 
more members from Afro-Asia had joined India and Pakistan at the Commonwealth 
Conference. The strong campaign by India, Ghana and Malaya led to the withdrawal of South 
Africa from the institution a year later (for a analyses, see Dubow, 2017 and Nothling, 2005).3 
We end in 1961, as South Africa’s expulsion from the Commonwealth meant the clash over 
race and racism had moved to a distinctly new phase.  
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We argue that there is something particular to the frustration, the irritation, that white 
diplomats felt which led them to roll their eyes at India’s ‘rants’ against racism rather than 
accept them as legitimate. If India’s anti-racist diplomacy could be construed not as a legitimate 
perspective on world affairs based on colonial grievances, but an unfair partiality, or a new 
imperialism, then India’s advocacy for a decolonized, deracialized world order, could be 




‘An Act of Faith’: India’s anti-racist project 
India framed its anti-racism in numerous forms. It could be subtle and quiet. It could 
appeal to the values associated with the British empire. It could be loud and aggressive, like at 
the UN when discussing South Africa. It was sometimes framed as based on a quiet ‘emotion’, 
or as a quasi-religious struggle. India also performed its anti-racism in a theatrical and 
aggressive manner at the UN and at Bandung. 
 
In 1946, before the formation of his interim government, Nehru had called upon the 
British Commonwealth and the UN ‘to cut her [South Africa] away from the family of nations 
if she follows the Nazi doctrine’. When he took over as the leader of the new interim 
government, he warned, that ‘if [the] UNO (sic), Europe, or America do not… [cut off South 
Africa] the time will soon come when all Asia may do that, and so might Africa’ (Nehru, Quoted 
in Pachai, 1971). This reflected India’s attitude at the UN where its representative Maharaj 
Singh criticized Smuts’ racism and told him that India will raise the voice for all non-self-
governing peoples and work towards ensuring that autonomous and independent governments 
were installed in every part of the world. In the Indian parliament in December of 1947, Nehru 
argued that ‘[i]n supporting the cause of Indians in South Africa we have worked not only for 
the rights of people of our own race but for the rights of oppressed throughout the world. That 
attitude we are determined to maintain in the firm faith that our cause is right and that ultimately 
right will prevail’.4 
  
There was also subtler public diplomacy aimed at Australia and Canada. In 1948, Nehru 
(1948, p. 547) emphasized what Australia and India shared, stating in a message to Australia 
that:  
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We stand, as I believe Australia does, for democratic freedom, for human rights 
and for the ending of the political domination or economic exploitation of one 
nation or group of another. We should cooperate, therefore, for the extension of 
freedom, equality and social justice. 
  
In a similar approach, while speaking to the Canadian House of Commons, Nehru discussed his 
efforts to end racial discrimination. He argued that Canada and India should be able to work 
together in this realm, stating that: 
India’s championship of freedom and racial equality in Asia, as well as in 
Africa, is a natural urge of the facts of geography and history. India desires no 
leadership or dominion or authority over any other country… Canada, with her 
traditions of democracy, her sense of justice and her love of fair play, should 
understand our purpose and our motives and should use her growing wealth 
and power to extend the horizons of freedom.5 
 
Here, by evoking ‘British’ liberal of freedom and democracy, Nehru could critique the racial 
discrimination practiced by Australia and Canada, while performing his version of Englishness.  
 
In 1951, an article appeared in the East African press from the Bombay Forum 
newspaper, arguing that: 
India seeks no power and glory and pelf for herself. India wants the other part 
of the Orient to be free and strong and independent. Thereafter her mission 
will not end until the flag of white racialism, for the present firmly planted in 
Africa, is hurled into the dust.6 
 
India’s motivation for its anti-racist diplomacy was contested heavily and perceived very 
differently by the South Africans. This more aggressive framing was met with South African 
suspicions. A diplomat commenting on this article argued that: ‘[t]here can be little doubt that 
the fear of further Indian penetration into Africa constitutes at present the strongest link 
between East Africa and the Union’.7 
 
Through the 1950s, India’s framing at the UN remained aggressive. Krishna Menon 
argued in 1954 that:  
…when we approach this problem, we should understand the kind of 
earnestness and, from that particular point of view, the fullness of spirit with 
which this is approached. It is not just a political policy. We are up against 
something very much more fundamental. We are up against an evangelical 
view of the feeling in regard to races, the color and mixture of races and all the 
rest of it.8  
 
As we will see, the Australians would occasionally state that when facing India, they themselves 
were ‘up against’ an irrational, evangelical point of view. Nehru (1954), speaking in the 
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parliament was keen to emphasize that India’s anti-racism was something that was both 
emotional and rational:  
This problem of racialism and racial separation may become more dangerous 
than any other problem that the world has to face. I should like the countries of 
Europe, America, Asia and Africa to realise that and not to imagine that we are 
putting up with these things that are happening in Africa, whether on the 
communal plane or on the racial plane. They hurt us. Simply because we cannot 
do anything effective and we do not want to cheapen ourselves by mere 
shouting, we remain quiet. But the thing has gone deep down into our minds 
and hearts. We feel it strongly. 
 
When speaking in English, Nehru constructed the issue as one of deep hurt but measured 
actions. But another speech in 1955, originally in Hindi, argued that:  
We will never forget this open zoolum [atrocity] which the South African 
government is perpetrating with impunity on crores of African and Indian 
people there. This naked persecution on the basis of colour will never go down 
the throats of these people. We are not prepared to tolerate this racial 
persecution under any consideration of communism or anti-communism.9  
 
In his English speech, Nehru suggests a policy of restraint, but when speaking to his domestic 
audience in Hindi, he argues that India could not tolerate racism. 
 
 Nehru was also keen to ensure that his critique of colonialism and Bandung was not too 
threatening when it came to Australia and New Zealand. Nehru (1955, pp. 288-291) suggested 
that: 
I would like Australia and New Zealand to come nearer to Asia. I would 
welcome them because I do not want what we say or do to be based on racial 
prejudices. We have had enough of this racialism elsewhere. 
 
This performance is measured. It was careful to define its anti-racism as not based on racial 
ideas. Australia and New Zealand are welcomed in to Asia, though they were observers rather 
than participants at Bandung. Nehru takes the race out of his anti-racism, to appeal to settler 
colonies on the outskirts of Asia.  
 
From 1955 onwards, South Africa refused to discuss the issue at the UN. Still, India 
continued. In 1961, S Jha stated to the special political committee ‘It is not only our duty but… 
an act of faith… We shall not rest content until inequality and racial discrimination have 
disappeared from South Africa. In this we have the mandate of millions of people in India and 
elsewhere.’10 By this time, this was no longer likely to have success outside of South Africa. 
The ‘west’ had moved on, but India’s anti-racist politics remained. Jha continued that the UN 
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must go on giving expression to world opinion on the issue ‘until the conscience of the rulers 
of South Africa is roused, and they recognize that the only thing to do is remodel society and 
government’ in South Africa on the basis of equality and freedom from racial discrimination.11 
 
‘Emotional’ and ‘hypocritical’: Dismissing anti-racism as irrational 
This leads us to the first example for rejecting India’s campaign against racism: writing 
if off as irrational, hypocritical ‘emotionalism’. Although Canada and Australia had very 
different responses to Indian anti-racism, Australia in particular grew tired of it throughout the 
1950s. Under the conservative leadership of John Diefenbaker as well as the liberal Louis St. 
Laurent and Lester Pearson, Canada consistently opposed South Africa’s apartheid policies, but 
grew frustrated with India’s larger anti-racist project. Australia under its Anglophile PM Robert 
Menzies, was friendly towards South Africa and dismissive of India (Davis, 2015). Despite 
different approaches, Canada and Australia tended towards dismissing India’s anti-racism as 
irrational and as preventing it from focusing on the Cold War.  
 
 Australia’s first leader over this period was Labor’s Ben Chifley. Chifley and his 
External Affairs minister Herbert Evatt supported Indian independence and Australian 
representatives attended the 1947 and 1949 Asian Conferences in India (Suares, 2011). At the 
1949 conference, aimed at discussing Dutch aggression in Indonesia, the Australian press 
warned they would be confronted by a ‘racially antagonistic… pressure group’ led by Nehru 
(Burton, in Suares, 2011: 505). Australian officials, though, found themselves in lock-step with 
Nehru, much to the surprise of High Commissioner to India Herbert Gollan. Gollan, reported 
that ‘there was generally little tendency to emotionalism or anti Dutch tirades during the 
session.’12 In this early period, despite expectations of anti-colonial tirades, the Australians 
accepted anti-racism as a legitimate position. 
 
Under Menzies, however, Australia found India far more tiresome. Menzies (1969, p. 
92) himself was not particularly interested in India, stating in his memoirs that India was too 
confusing a place for any ‘occidental’ to understand. Menzies and Nehru did not get on well. 
Walter Crocker, a long-serving Australian High Commissioner to India, noted that when 
Menzies came to India, he was bored and did not want to see the sights (Gurry, 1992, p. 513). 
They had one particularly aggressive spat over Cold War disarmament issues, at a session of 
the UN General Assembly in September-October 1960. Nehru, sought to promote disarmament 
as a key matter for the Non-Aligned Movement, and rebuked Menzies for his approach.  
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Menzies found Nehru’s vision of diplomacy incomprehensible. He wrote to his wife 
immediately after the clash that ‘[a]ll the primitive came out in [Nehru]’ (Menzies, quoted in 
Martin, 1999: 422). A month later, Menzies repeated the story with even more racist language 
in a letter to his friend U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, stating that ‘I am still a 
little mystified about Nehru’s attack which I assure you was of the most intemperate kind. He 
did not revert to the Kashmir Brahmin. He seemed to me to revert almost to the branches of 
trees. He bared his teeth and snarled. He ranted.’13 
 
A year later, Australia was hopeful of gaining India’s support for its holding of New 
Guinea as a colonial possession. Australia held New Guinea from 1920 until its peaceful 
independence in 1975. Periodically, however, the mandate would need renewal, leading to a 
UN vote. Crocker met with Indian High Commissioner Samar Sen and attempted to convince 
Sen to support Australia’s colonial project. In private musings about the meeting, Crocker 
attacked India’s hypocrisy with regard to racism: 
 
The strange thing is that this hyper-sensitiveness about racial colour and about 
slights, real or fancied, perpetuated by Europeans, is found in a people who have 
no equal for colour prejudice. Marriages in India are still arranged; matrimonial 
advertisements are therefore common. In the pages given to matrimonial 
advertisements in The Hindustan Times the majority of advertisements will 
demand, or will be vaunting, fairness in the girl.14 
 
He lamented of Sen’s views, ‘[He] sees New Guinea as little more than one relic of the 
European's, the white man's, unjustified domination of the world.’15 Crocker carried on 
attacking the approach of Sen, extrapolating it to all Indians:  
 
It is symptomatic of the lack of understanding and appreciation we are likely 
to find in the U.N. Meetings, and it is symptomatic of what we will have to 
expect from the most powerful of the anti-colonial countries, namely India. It 
is, moreover, worse than just a case of lack of understanding and appreciation. 
We are up against an emotional attitude so strong as to blind Indians to reality, 
to say nothing of blinding them to the mote in their own eyes. It is irrational; it 
seems to be unteachable.16 
  
Here, anti-racism is seen as blinding India to the objective realities of world politics, in a 
manner which cannot be corrected.  
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Throughout his time in India, Crocker was fascinated with Nehru, publishing a book 
devoted to him. He doubtless admired Nehru. In his closing assessment, though he wondered 
why Nehru had been so keen to protect the more aggressively anti-colonial Krishna Menon. 
He concluded that it might have been down to Nehru’s emotions: 
Is it too fanciful to wonder if Krishna Menon gave expression from time to 
time to certain subliminal things in Nehru which he would not allow his 
conscious self to express, such as on the west or on America or on race? Nehru 
by nature was an emotional man who had schooled himself into an iron self-
control. It is for the psychologists to explain whether Krishna Menon might… 
have served the purpose of expressing Nehru’s subconscious mind for him 
and thus materializing getting out of his system certain demonic currents 
inside him. (Crocker, 1966, p.157). 
 
Here, Nehru’s ‘demonic currents’ which were driven by his emotional side mostly likely refer 
to his anti-imperialism.  
 
Over the 1950s, Canada pursued policies which were more favourable to India than 
Australia’s. Canada allowed Indians to emigrate to Canada and granted citizenship to its 
existing Indian population, as the US had done, while Australia flatly refused. This itself was 
a concession to India’s anti-racist project, though the mechanism by which the tiny quota of 
150 Indians per year caused friction. This friction was dismissed by the Canadians as due to 
the irrationalities of the Indian High Commissioner Ramji Saxena.17 By the mid-1950s, though, 
some Canadian diplomats ceased accept some colonial grievances as legitimate and tended to 
dismiss India as a hypocritical actor.  
 
Under the guidance of St. Laurent, and particularly during the term of deeply idealistic 
diplomat Escott Reid, Canada sought to translate India to the US. For Reid, India held a 
hybridity: a stable democracy that might share Canada’s values, but needed to be interpreted 
clearly. He saw India and Canada as possible ‘bridges’ between ‘East’ and ‘West’, meaning 
that India-Canada relations were essential to global peace and security. Likewise, Lester 
Pearson argued in India under Reid’s tenure that he hoped that the Commonwealth might ‘act 
as a bridge between Asia and the West, at a time when there are all too few bridges of this 
kind’.18 
 
Despite Reid’s project, or perhaps, because of it, there were continual difficulties 
between India and Canada. Ultimately, the two states did not see the world the same way 
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(Touhey, 2015). Reid began to grow frustrated by India’s anti-racism, viewing it as a partiality. 
One lengthy report in 1956 argued that  
Mr Nehru has grudges to contend with in his own heart and in the heart of India 
which are much more ancient and much more deep-rooted… [Nehru’s] mind 
is receptive to visual impressions of imperialism and aggression in Egypt. Even 
if his mind were to receive equally clear visual impressions of imperialism and 
aggression in Hungary, his mind would do its best to reject those impressions 
as a false reality.19 
 
He concluded that with subtle Canadian persuasion, Nehru’s position could be influenced: 
  
Being a sensitive man, once he begins to feel for [Hungary] and with them he 
will begin to feel a nauseating revulsion against the brutality and treachery of the 
Russians…. Once the barriers begin to come down the game in India can be won 
by the West – if we play our cards well.20 
  
Here, India was thought of as unable to see Suez and Hungary clearly due to its racial blind 
spots. Reid still believed, however, that India could be brought around. He saw India as 
teachable, in a way Crocker did not.  
 
Reid’s project was contested within the Canadian MEA. Chester Ronning, a diplomat 
working from Ottawa, complained that Delhi saw imperialism as just ‘white domination of non-
white peoples’, and could not see Soviet domination of Eastern Europe as imperialism.21 Lester 
Pearson touched on this in 1955, when he commented that ‘Nehru was quite bitter about 
American policy, and resented, as an Asian, their bullying and threatening tactics. He obviously 
doesn’t feel the same resentment when Chou bullies and blusters, because Chou is not so much 
a Communist as an Asian’.22 This was seen as a double standard, but one that could be 
overcome.  
 
Another Canadian diplomat, J.H. Cleveland, disagreed with Reid’s project. He argued 
in 1956 that India’s desires to annex the small French and Portuguese colonies within India 
might only be the beginning:  
Undiscriminating Canadian support for Nehru and India might lead to 
imposition of a new type of imperialism in Asia and Africa. My personal 
impression is that India is expansionist. Pondicherry and Goa are but the 
prelude to annexation, penetration or satellite control of much of southern Asia 
and Africa.23 
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This is a rare example of viewing India as a possible imperialist from Canada, which we will 
return to below. 
 
While Australian and Canadian diplomats viewed strains of unnecessary, even 
primordial, idealism and deep-rooted anti-Western prejudice in India’s emotional behaviour, 
South Africans viewed it as outright hypocrisy and devious design. In an internal memo in 
1952, G.P. Jooste, South Africa’s permanent representative at the UN, argued that India 
deliberately made race an ‘emotional’ issue, arguing that: 
 
We need but read the title [of the Indian item at the UN] – ‘Treatment of the 
Indians in the Union of South Africa’. When ‘treatment’ is therefore, by a 
process of misrepresentation of fact, given the meaning of ‘oppression’ then, 
clearly, this item immediately has an emotional impact on all who, in this 
organization, believe in the promotion of human happiness. This we fully 
understand and it is because of this fact that we so strongly despise the false 
position in which we are placed by the actions and especially the words of 
Indian delegates.24 
 
Here, India’s emotional performance is seen as just that: a performance. South African internal 
memos repeatedly argue that this was not directed towards securing the human rights for South 
African Indians or to combat racial discrimination. Rather, India’s only aim was to seek 
‘prestige’. In hankering after status and prestige, India did not even care about the ‘terrible 
injustice’ it caused South Africa.25 This allows South Africa to be the victim.  
 
Finally, South Africa’s response to India’s tirades at the UN was to constantly 
emphasise the latter’s hypocrisy, but in a more aggressive fashion. South African diplomats 
pointed to India’s stances on Kashmir and Hyderabad and the continuing practice of casteism 
as evidences of India’s hypocrisy on human rights. Casteism was defined as ‘Apartheid in 
India’, despite India dismantling its caste system in law while South Africa was doing the 
opposite on race.26 This line of attack became particularly vicious when Eric Louw, South 
Africa’s foreign minister from 1955 to 1963, attended UN sessions. Louw, who had notoriously 
gained himself monikers such as the ‘undiplomatic diplomat’ (Van Wyk, 2005) and ‘South 
Africa’s Goebbels’, (Pogrund, 1990) threw allegations of hypocrisy on human rights on not 
just Indians but all countries who opposed South Africa at the UN (van Rensburg, 1962 and 
Wolvaardt, 2006).  
 
A new ‘Brown Empire’?: Anti-Racism as an Imperialist project  
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The idea that India was a new imperialist power was deeply embedded within South 
African diplomatic discourse, though it appeared only very occasionally within Australian and 
Canadian discourse on India’s foreign policy projects. A Scottish-Australian journalist Erskine 
Wyse devoted an entire book to this idea in 1946, the unsubtly titled ‘Brown Empire’. He 
argued that Indian independence would pose a strategic problem for Australia because India 
would seek an Asian empire of its own. This was an especially fearful prospect for Wyse (1946: 
113-116), as he believed Hindu society had quasi-fascist tendencies and because leaders like 
Nehru operated ‘on an emotional basis instead of… logical conviction.’ Frederick Eggleston, 
an early Australian IR scholar, once wrote to Crocker, arguing that, ‘India has many fighting 
races and very many trained soldiers and she may easily become an Imperialist Power if she is 
able to overcome her internal problems’.27 Cleveland’s example, discussed above, was an 
outlier on the Canadian side. These isolated examples, though at most a mild undercurrent, 
illustrate that these three states were drawing from the same set of narratives. Our spotlight 
here falls squarely on South Africa. 
 
The belief that India had designs on Africa had roots before Indian independence. Parts 
of East Africa had been run from India under the Raj (Blyth, 2003). In the early 20th century, 
some Indian liberals had called for parts of Eastern Africa to become a colony of British India, 
given the strong presence of Indian diaspora. This demand was completely repudiated by the 
leadership of the Indian National Congress (Blyth, 2003). European settlers were alarmed by 
the increasing Indian presence. In the 1920s, South Africa and Jan Smuts (1930) in particular 
had played on these fears to push for the idea of a ‘Greater South Africa’ from the Cape to 
Kenya. In the 1940s, as Indian independence drew near, Smuts reinvigorated the debate about 
the Indian as a coloniser in Africa. He said: 
South Africa is a little epic of European civilisation on a dark continent. India 
is threatening this noble experiment with her vast millions who have frustrated 
themselves and now threaten to frustrate us. All along the coast of Africa from 
Mombasa to Durban and ultimately to Cape Town they are invading, 
infiltrating in all sorts of devious ways to reverse the role which we have 
thought our destiny. East and West meet at this moment of history and I 
frankly am a Westerner, although I love and respect the whole human family, 
irrespective of colour and race. We stand for something which we will go and 
be lost to the world, if India gets control of eastern South Africa. (Smuts, in 
Van der Poel, 1973, p. 101). 
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Here, Smuts tied India’s population to its possible imperialism, but asserted that his desire to 
resist this was based on the superiority of western civilization rather than a scientific racism. 
The discourse, though, only became more extreme. 
 
In each of these cases, it was assumed that the Indian diaspora, who had been spread 
around the world by colonial practices, would remain loyal to India and act as the ‘fifth column’ 
for Indian empire.28 Even Nehru was, at some level, sympathetic to the idea that the Indian 
diaspora tended to isolate themselves from the local struggles and look towards India as their 
natural home.29 To the dismay of many, Nehru repeatedly made the point in his diaspora policy 
that Indians in other countries must identify themselves with the struggles of the local 
population. This failed to reassure the South African government, which saw the entire Indian 
population in Africa as ‘foreign'. The telos of apartheid ideology, indeed, was repatriation of 
the entire Indian population from South Africa.30 
 
One of the most forceful proponents of the repatriation of Indians from South Africa 
was G. Heaten Nicholls. Nicholls was Smuts’ deputy at the 1946 UN General Assembly (and 
South Africa’s High Commissioner to London), and his deeply racist speech at the UN was 
one of the reasons why South Africa lost the vote to India. A politician from Natal, Nicholls 
stated to the South African parliament in 1949: ‘the real struggle today is a struggle between 
India and the Europeans for the possession of Africa’.31 He was responding to D.F. Malan’s 
speech outlining his foreign policy. Notably, Nicholls came from a party which was more 
liberal than Malan’s, but criticised Malan for being less serious about the Indian threat. This 
reflects a relative consensus in South African politics on India’s nefarious intents. 
 
 At the UN however, South Africa was initially measured in its accusations. In a speech 
at the UN, G.P. Jooste tried to make the case gently:  
has it not become clear to all who have followed the course of Indian 
penetration into the continent of Africa, how the racial pattern in parts of that 
Continent is being changed… in a manner which cannot leave us in doubt as to 
the nature of Indian objectives in Africa… There are also of course other parts 
of the world similarly affected. I will leave it yet to each and every one familiar 
with, or representing, those areas to draw his own conclusions.32 
 
The accusations became more hyperbolic. On 11 August 1953, Malan stated to the parliament 
that ‘India is a danger not only to Africa but also to all Powers with interests in Africa.’ He 
argued that India was trying to load off its excess population in Africa and that ‘India was a 
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danger for Africa – in Natal, in Southern and Northern Rhodesia and in East Africa.’ Indeed, 
Jooste argued that on every occasion of a difference between whites and non-whites in South 
Africa, India deliberately sided with the non-whites and attributed the resistance campaign in 
South Africa directly to an appeal made by Nehru. Nehru had done the same in Kenya, he 
argued, where Nehru had asked Indians to stand with the Kenya Land and Freedom Army 
(often known by the pejorative British term, Mau Mau). Malan also included the UN in India’s 
nefarious designs and asked the Commonwealth to stand together and ‘drive the UN back 
within its own boundaries’.33 Continuing his tirade India, Malan stated that India’s primary aim 
was to drive the white man from Africa and asked why India did not interfere in the affairs of 
Australia which was closer to India and had vast tracts of unpopulated lands (Anon, 1953). 
Louw also drew on the idea that India wished to control Africa to dispatch its poorest people. 
He pitched this as a clash for who would control and colonize Africa: the ‘West’, the Soviet 
Union or India. He concluded that that ‘[t]he aim of India is to obtain a dumping ground for its 
millions of surplus population, and eventually to take the place of the present despised 
“colonial” powers.’34  
 
 Worried about India’s designs, South Africa viewed every Indian move as a 
confirmation of the latter’s imperialism. When India decided to send a commissioner to Accra 
with jurisdiction in the Gold Coast (present day Ghana) and Nigeria, South Africa saw only 
infiltration.35 Here, anti-racism is recast as a security discourse. Couched in geopolitical terms, 
India’s anti-racism becomes securitised, something demanding a strategic response.  
 
South Africa’s view of India as imperialist and security threat was exemplified when 
Menzies visited in 1953. Speaking in Menzies’ presence, Malan referred to Australia and South 
Africa as ‘The Twin sisters of the Southern Seas’, a bond based not on ‘a cultural and racial 
affinity rooted in a common pioneering history (implicitly suggesting this was an element), but 
as a bulwark against ‘powers in the Indian Ocean’. He carried on to say that these ‘powers’ 
would threaten white civilization and ‘might soon be knocking on the door of Australia’. To 
his mind, the call for ‘the white man [to] quit Africa’ really concluded ‘and let India enter in’. 
Malan concluded that Nehru was ‘the enemy of White man’ and promised South African aid 
to Australia in the event of an Indian attack. In response, Menzies merely affirmed 
‘Commonwealth unity’.36 
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One largely unexamined element of the UN South Africa-India clash is a low key 
struggle fought through UNESCO over the construction of global human rights norms. After 
several years of debate on the nature of human rights, an anonymous South African 
representative wrote to their colleagues that the anti-colonial nature of the human rights 
movement was deeply troubling. The discussions were ‘tainted… by the vicious anti-colonial 
political currents which mill below the seemingly idealistic surface of the human rights 
question.’37 They argued that: 
The plain truth is, and who should know this better than South Africa, that the 
human rights game is one of the most insidious present day political past-times 
of the United Nations anti-colonial pressure groups; to them the draft covenants 
are merely political vehicles towards a political end.38 
 
The author listed all the various anti-colonial groupings, describing their sinister motivations. 
They suggested that when Morocco talks of human rights, they are thinking of pan-Islamism, 
when Greece does so it is really thinking of Cyprus, Russian talk of decolonization in Africa 
dreams of a brutal new ‘Imperialism a la Russe’ and the South Americans of ‘their own 
ebullient liberation from the Iberian yoke’.39 The strongest words were left for India, however, 
evoking Nazi Germany, ‘when the Indians speak of self-determination they are thinking of 
“lebensraum” for themselves.’40 The debate had come full circle. What began with Nehru’s 
campaign against South Africa’s ‘Nazi doctrine’ had be reframed as India’s quest for 
Lebensraum. The displays of emotion made by India were seen as cold, calculating realpolitik 
to disguise a nefarious goal of expansionism.  
 
Conclusion: Anti-Racist Performance, Racist Responses 
The response to India’s quest to keep race on the international agenda reveals a complex 
transnational politics of postcolonial identity. Australia painted India as irrational and 
emotional and denied India’s perception of reality. Canada tended more towards accepting 
India’s position, but found India’s campaign deeply frustrating. South Africa’s assertion that 
India’s anti-racism was not only hypocritical, but that it was itself imperialist enterprise today 
sounds absurd. Yet, it was rooted in long term issues of the empire and predated India’s efforts 
at the UN. And yet, the idea India would seek to colonize Southern Africa was deeply 
embedded and assumed as truth in the South African foreign policy discourse. Just as opposing 
racism today is sometimes attacked as racist, opposing imperialism could be seen as a form of 
imperialism.  
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India’s act of faith was to keep it the issue alive when the powerful did not want to hear 
it. The post-imperial world had moved on far quicker than the postcolonial world, enabled by 
their dismissals of India’s anti-racist performances. The idea that India is an imperialist power 
has largely dissipated from global political discourse. And yet, the idea’s conspiratorial nature, 
it played a part in the dismissal of race as a top-tier international issue. While South Africa 
employed it to ignore India’s aggressive rhetoric, but it also exemplified the former’s own 
increasing paranoia about race and security. But the imperial powers had moved on far quicker 
than the postcolonial world, and was enabled by these two means of dismissing India’s anti-
racist performances. These discourses limited India’s anti-racist successes to the most extreme 
case of South Africa. It left South Africa isolated. But the responses of the post-imperial world 
to anti-racism limited race as an international issue, meaning racism was left largely 
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